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WHAT DOES BAKKE REQUIRE OF LAW SCHOOLS? 
THE SALT BOARD OF GOVERNORS STATEMENT* 
HOWAARD LESNICK t 
I. THE ISSUES FACING LA w SCHOOLS 
The decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in 
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke 1 has prompted 
many law schools, and the universities of which they are parts, to 
reexamine existing admissions criteria and procedures. Such re-
examinations may raise considerations of educational policy, in-
cluding issues of fairness and justice to the individuals and groups 
affected by race-conscious admissions programs. They may also 
involve the introduction of legal imperatives perceived to arise from 
the Bakke decision itself. All too often, there is a tendency to 
merge these very distinct inputs, and to seek refuge from the burden 
of pursuing difficult and divisive issues of policy in an asserted 
legal compulsion. 
This essay does not undertake to reexamine the questions of 
educational and social policy involved in the establishment or 
structuring of particular admissions programs. The question it does 
address is: What changes (if any) in minority-admissions programs 
are university law schools now obliged to make to comply with the 
Supreme Court's decision in Bakke-put another way, what forms 
of programs are now placed beyond the discretion of individual 
schools? 
In examining this question, we should begin by clarifying 
two conditioning factors. The first concerns the moral imperative 
to obey the normative standards of the law (including the principle 
that one should avoid encouraging litigation); the second is the 
role of university counsel in guiding consideration of important 
changes in an admissions program. 
*This essay is a slightly revised version of a paper prepared by Professor 
Lesnick for the Board of Governors of the Society of American Law Teachers and 
adopted by it in January, 1979, as a statement of the Board, The Society of Amer-
ican Law Teachers is a membership organization of individual law teachers. It is 
interested in questions concerning the capacity of the legal profession, as a public 
profession, to serve societal needs, and in the relation between legal education and 
the quality and availability of legal representation, including matters of professional 
responsibility and greater equality of access to the legal profession and to legal 
representation, It has worked to support the appropriate use of race-conscious 
admissions criteria by law schools, 
+ Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania, A.B. 1952, New York Univer-
sity; A.M. 1953, LL.M. 1958, Columbia University, 
1 438 U.S, 265 ( 1978). 
(141) 
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As lawyers and teachers of law, members of law school faculties 
presumably accept, indeed espouse, an obligation to obey the law, 
not only in the narrow sense of Justice Holmes's "bad man," but, 
more broadly, to seek to conform their conduct to what they have 
conscientiously determined to be the norms embodied in it. It is 
essential, however, to recognize that this principle does not resolve 
the question of interpretation of a difficult set of opinions such as 
those produced by the Bakke litigation. It especially does not justify 
what amounts to a rule of construction favoring an interpretation 
giving the broadest tenable reach to every uncertain aspect of the 
decision. Such an approach may or may not commend itself, but it 
can claim no moral force: It is no more "ethical" or "responsible" 
than a rule of narrow construction, as long as each is held in good 
conscience and is objectively tenable. 
Nor is the value afforded simple prudence and the related 
desire to avoid litigation sufficient to justify an expansive reading 
of Bakke without taking into account the seriousness of the educa-
tional objectives which might be sacrificed thereby. Law schools 
reject many applicants for each accepted. The decision of the 
Supreme Court of California, unreversed by the Supreme Court, 
places on the school the burden of proving lack of any causal rela-
tion between a minority-admissions program and the rejection of a 
particular applicant.2 Presumably, then, a rejected white applicant 
wishing to assert a claim of unlawful "reverse discrimination" will 
often be able to force a school to defend its admissions program 
merely by showing that he had a higher admissions score than a 
successful minority candidate.3 Each school has dozens, perhaps 
hundreds, of such potential plaintiffs each year. Moreover, it seems 
clear that this will remain true no matter how a minority-admis-
sions program is changed. While one might hope that the likeli-
hood that potential plaintiffs will actually sue would be reduced by 
the evident eagerness of a university to avoid legal challenge, no 
one can confidently assert that such an effort would be totally suc-
cessful. Thus, because universities will live with a substantial risk 
of litigation no matter what they do, it would be fruitless to sacrifice 
important educational objectives in the hope of escaping the threat 
of suit. 
2 Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 18 Cal. 3d 34, 63-64, 553 P.2d 1152, 
1172, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680, 700 ( 1976). In the Supreme Court, see Bakke, 438 
U.S. at 280 n.13. 
3 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 277 & n.7, 280. 
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In such a climate, and bearing in mind that many law teachers 
feel a strong ethical obligation not to have too weak a minority-
admissions program, the strength of the case for particular changes 
in a school's program will more often need to be made on the 
basis of a contention that valued educational objectives will not be 
impaired - that is, on considerations of policy, fairness, and equity-
than on a desire to avoid litigation or the risk of legal liability. 
Law schools are in a difficult position no matter how they act, for 
their responses to the competing demands affecting the shape of a 
minority-admissions program implicate the interests of many beside 
themselves: minority and non-minority applicants and students, the 
university as a whole, the legal profession, and the larger society. 
For many of us, it is uncomfortable to be making decisions affecting 
these interests. It is essential to recognize that there is no escape 
from that· discomfort. Any decision a law school makes has such an 
impact, and the propriety of a particular decision within the range 
of arguable· differences over what the law requires must therefore 
be ultimately justified on policy grounds. A school may choose to 
narrow its program more than is required, but it would be tragic 
for such a choice to be made on the basis of supposed moral or 
legal imperatives grounded in a broader reading of Bakke than a 
conscientious, fair-minded analysis requires. 
In this connection, the role of university counsel is a critical 
one, and law professors should be particularly advertent to that role. 
The task most schools will face is not the shaping of a law suit or the 
drafting of a brief in support of a program challenged in court. 
It will be the more sensitive, less familiar one of a claimed need 
to restructure an existing program to avoid litigation or a threat 
of liability, or to carry out what is argued to be a morally required 
course of action. Critical decisions narrowing a program might be 
made by law school faculties or administrations or by university 
administrations. The latter will often look to their counsel to 
learn what their legal obligations are. Faculty members who be-
lieve that a particular program remains lawful, and that university 
trustees or administrators should not insist on changes out of a 
belief that they have no choice under the law, should be aware of 
the hazards of seeking to persuade lay adrninistratms or trustees of 
the legal merit of a position contrary to that taken by their at-
torneys. Rather, attention should be paid to the advice-giving 
process .itself. 
As an example, a faculty faced with the assertion that the ad-
ministration has been advised that a particular program is now 
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unlawful should insist that that advice be supported by a written 
opinion of counsel. Such a course will often deter, and will at least 
expose, advice based on nothing more than a reflexive preference for 
the most cautious-that is, the broadest possible-reading of the deci-
sion. The critical vice in such a preference is that it overrides the 
concerns of educational policy which are sacrificed by the particular 
changes said to be mandated, not because a conscious policy choice 
is made that the costs involved are not entitled to greater weight, 
but because the issue is said to be removed from the policy arena. 
Once the issue is perceived as one of educational policy, it becomes 
clear that it is not the function of counsel to determine what weight 
particular objectives should have. Specifically, it is not the role of 
counsel to decide whether or not the setting of a particular nu-
merical goal, the administration of a program by a particular form 
of committee, or the input of specific policy objectives are im-
portant to the achievement of particular educational aims. 
The question, what is removed from university discretion by 
Bakke, is the subject of this essay. The discussion which follows 
assumes that the reader is familiar with the litigation involving the 
admissions program of the University of California Medical School 
at Davis. It will be recalled that all of the Justices expressed views 
with respect to the meaning of the statutory prohibition contained 
in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,4 but only five spoke to 
the meaning of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. The litigation produced two different five-Justice ma-
jorities, one to affirm the judgment that the Davis program was 
unlawful and another to reverse the judgment that race may not be 
a positive factor in determining relative admissibility.6 Justice 
Powell was the only Justice in the majority on both dispositions. 
Section II examines the question whether the mandate of Bakke is 
4 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq. ( 1977 ). 
5 Justice Powell, who announced the judgment of the Court, held that Title VI 
proscribed "only those racial classifications that would violate the Equal Protection 
Clause or the Fifth Amendment." Bakke, 438 U.S. at 287. Justices Brennan, 
White, Marshall, and Blackmun agreed with Justice Powell: "Title VI goes no 
further in prohibiting the use of race than the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment .... " Id. 325. Justice Stevens, in an opinion joined by 
Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and Rehnquist, held that Title VI was 
not limited by. the substantive reach of the fourteenth amendment, id. 416-18, and 
that the medical school's minority-admissions program violated Title VI, id. 421. 
The Stevens Four declined to reach the constitutional issue, id. 411-12, 421. 
6 Justice Powell, disagreeing with the Brennan Four, found that the Davis 
program violated constitutional standards. Accordingly, he voted with Chief Jus-
tice Burger and Justices Stewart, Rehnquist, and Stevens to form the majority 
holding the Davis program unlawful. Id. 271. Justice Powell voted with Justices 
Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun to form the majority holding that it is 
not always unlawful to consider race in an admissions program. Id. 272. 
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to be found in his position; section III considers what he would 
require of minority-admissions programs. 
II. THE AUTHORITATIVENESS OF THE POWELL POSITION 
It was understandable that the immediate reaction of many 
to the Bakke decision was to find "the law" in the views of Justice 
Powell. He not only announced the judgment of the Court, but 
provided the "swing" votes and was therefore the only Justice whose 
position paralleled the actual disposition of the litigation between 
Mr. Bakke and the University of California Medical School at 
Davis. By combining the opinions of Justices Powell and Stevens, 
the proponents of this view argue that five members of the Court 
announced views which hold at least that a minority-admissions 
plan failing to meet .Justice Powell's constitutional standards vi-
olates Title VI. In making this argument, these commentators 
are not predicting how the Justices will vote in futu:re litigation; 
rather they are contending that this rule commands normative force. 
It is important to recognize that, although this initial view 
persists in legal as well as popular discussions, and indeed is held 
by many law teachers,7 it rests on premises plainly open to reason-
able debate and dispute. As the Report of the American Council 
on Education and the Association of American Law Schools Com-
mittee on Bakke concluded: 
Justice Powell ... addressed only two of the many possible 
approaches to race-conscious admissions. Moreover, four 
members of the Court did not address the issue of the per- 
missible use of race under the Constitution, while four 
others believe that the Constitution would permit more 
extensive use of race than did Justice Powell. . . . No 
Justice concurred in the Powell discussion of permissible 
and impermissible purposes. Under the circumstances, 
it is not at all clear what might be the result if the Court 
were faced with a slightly different admission plan or a 
similar plan under different circumstances. 8 
The conclusion that Justice Powell's views express the min-
imum standards of legality for a minority-admissions program under 
7 For a carefully reasoned conclusion to this effect, see Blasi, Bakke as Prece-
dent: Does Mr. Justice Powell Have a Theory?, 67 CAL. L. REV. 21, 23-24, 30 
( 1979 }. For a casual assumption of a similar conclusion, see Posner, The Bakke 
Case and the Future of Affirmative Action, 67 CAL. L. REv. 171, 177-78 & n.20 
(1979). 
8 AMERICAN COUNCIL ON Em:ICATION and ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW 
SCHOOLS, THE BAKKE DECISION: IMPLICATIONS FOR HIGHER EDUCATION ADMISSIONS 
17 (1978). 
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Title VI depends on the truth of three propositions. First, it is 
contended that, since Justice Powell read Title VI to condemn 
admissions arrangements violative of the Constitution, and since he 
went on to hold that the Davis program did violate the fourteenth 
amendment, he necessarily held that it violated the statute as well. 
Second, the opinion by Justice Stevens is read to hold that Title VI 
mandates a "colorblind" approach and that all race-conscious pro-
grams are therefore unlawful under it. Finally, it is asserted that 
those Justices joining the Stevens opinion may still claim normative 
power for its view of the statute, because the five Justices rejecting it 
do not themselves agree on the proper reading of Title VI (that is, 
although all five agree that the question under the statute turns on 
the meaning of the equal protection clause, they differ as to that 
meaning).9 Until one or more of these propositions proves false 
in future litigation, so the argument runs, any program not meeting 
Justice Powell's criteria for constitutionality violates the statute. 
It is clear that the foregoing position is logically tenable. It is 
noless clear that, at each point, it chooses to regard as not control-
ling significant factors which point another way, and that the issue 
whether those factors are to be controliing is one on which the 
Court itself has not spoken. 
To begin with the Stevens opinion, although the interpretation 
described above surely draws support from the content of Justice 
Stevens's discussion of Title VI, it chooses to give no substantial 
weight to the observation he was at pains to emphasize at the outset 
-that theissue before the Court concerned only the Davis minority-
admissions program and, indeed, only involved it to the extent that 
it affected the processing of Bakke's own application. "[T]here is 
no outstanding injunction forbidding any consideration of racial 
criteria in processing applications," 10 Justice Stevens emphasized, 
and argued that it was "therefore perfectly clear that the question 
whether race can ever be used as a factor in an admissions decision 
is not an issue in this case, and that discussion of that issue is inap-
propriate." 11 Many find it difficult to reconcile Justice Stevens's 
concern for confining the reach of his opinion with the apparently 
broader implications of his substantive discussion-in particular, 
his omission to refer to any specific failing of the Davis program 
9 Justice Powell's view of the constitutional issue is discussed below, see section 
Ill infra; for the approach of the Brennan Four, see Greenawalt, The Unresolved 
Problems of Reverse Discrimination, 67 CAL. L. REv. 87, 110-17 (1979). 
10 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 411. 
11 Id. 
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other than race-consciousness itself. It may be that race-conscious 
programs would be permissible under Title VI, according to the 
Stevens view, where "regular" programs are thought or found to 
have a discriminatory purpose or effect. In any event, it is ulti-
mately for Justice Stevens-and for each of the Justices joining his 
opinion-to find the proper basis for integrating its two branches, 
or failing in the attempt, to choose whether to discard the one or 
narrow the other. For the present, nothing more can be known 
than that there is more than one sensible way to read their posi-
tion.12 
Second, it is of course possible that each of the four Justices 
joining the Stevens opinion will believe that the matter of the 
proper meaning of Title VI is sufficiently clouded, by reason of the 
disagreement between Justice Powell and the four :remaining Jus-
tices over the content of the constitutional norms involved, to war-
rant his continuing to take a view of the statute rejected by five 
of his colleagues. It is, however, impossible to read the opinions 
as a whole without observing that the statutory issue was viewed by 
the entire Court in dilemmatic, abstract terms: whether Title 
VI embodied constitutional norms, or went beyond them. Put that 
way, the issue was squarely resolved in favor of the narrower posi-
tion by a five-Justice majority. 13 In those circumstances, it is surely 
not unreasonable to regard the statutory question as behind us, and 
view future litigation as turning solely on the proper construction 
of the fourteenth amendment. 
Finally, although in one sense it is logically deducible from 
Justice Powell's opinion that he would hold Title VI violated by a 
program which he viewed as unconstitutional, it would have been 
impossible him to join a holding that the medical school was 
12 Indeed, Justice Stewart, one of the Stevens Four, recently joined the opinion 
of the Court, per Justice Brennan, in United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 
99 S. Ct. 2721 ( 1979), which refused to construe Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et ( 1977), to prohibit all race-conscious programs to 
which it applied. (Justice did not participate in the decision.) Plaintiff's 
proffered reading of Title VII vvas similar to the broader reading of Title VI which 
some find taken in the Stevens opinion in and was rejected by the Court 
as inconsistent with the perceived dominant purpose to open opportuni-
ties for racial minorities. Voluntary programs serving this purpose, 
which do not "unnecessarily trammel the interests" of whites, 99 S. Ct. at 2730, 
were held lawful. 'While there are differences in purposes and scope be-
tween Title VII and Title VI, see ld. n.6, so that the criteria of legality 
adopted might differ under the two provisions, the view of the dominant legislative 
purpose which animated the 'Weber Court's rejection of a "color-blind" approach to 
Title VII seems to apply to Title VI as well. 
13 See note 5 supra. 
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liable under Title VI, without resolving the jurisdictional issue of 
Bakke's right to maintain an action under the statute.14 Indeed, 
although the trial court specifically found in Bakke's favor on 
statutory as well as constitutional grounds,15 Justice Powell's vote 
to affirm was carefully applied only to that portion of the judgment 
invalidating the program under the Constitution.16 While there is 
much force to the assertion that universities receiving federal finan-
cial support should not take advantage of the possibility that the 
Court may ultimately deny the existence of a private right of action, 
but should obey the substance of the statutory mandate once it is 
authoritatively construed by the Court, it is ironic to see that prin-
ciple advanced in this context, where a majority of the Court has 
squarely rejected the contention that Title VI goes beyond consti-
tutional norms, and four of the five Justices who discuss constitu-
tional norms have adopted a position permitting much which 
Justice Powell's position would proscribe. 
The point of recognizing that there are competing interpreta-
tions of Bakke is not to enable a school to choose a "correct" inter-
pretation. Law schools are not being asked to decide a case which 
will interpret and clarify Bakke, but to consider the extent of their 
own discretion under Bakke to do as wise educational policy seems 
to lead. The need in such a context is to recognize that tenable 
choices are available, and that those who insist that the Powell 
opinion has normative authoritativeness have chosen to take a broad 
reading of his and Justice Stevens's opinions at several critical points. 
They are of course free to do that, but others are equally free, 
morally and legally, to choose narrower interpretations. The crit-
ical issues remain ones of educational policy, including each uni-
versity's own sense of fairness in dealing with the competing interests. 
Those seeking to restrict minority-admissions programs should meet 
the issues of policy thereby raised. They should not seek to insulate 
their views on the merits of those issues by an appeal to respect for 
law and the Supreme Court. 
14 Justice Powell (like Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun) concluded 
that it was unnecessary to decide whether Title VI confers a private cause of action. 
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 283 (opinion of Powell, J.); id. 328 (opinion of the Brennan 
Four). Justice White decided that Title VI contained no such right of action, id. 
379-87, and the Justices joining the Stevens opinion, while asserting that the ques-
tion of the availability of a private right of action under Title VI was not properly 
before the Court, id. 419, indicated that they would infer a private right of action 
under the statute, see id. 419 & n.25, 420 & nn.27 & 28. 
15 Id. 270. 
16 ld. 320. 
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III. THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE POWELL POSITION 
It does not detract from the analysis in the preceding section to 
agree that Justice Powell's views are entitled to the most careful 
attention and deference and, indeed, that they may claim con-
trolling force when that can be given them without compromising 
important educational values. Accordingly, this section addresses 
the question: What kinds of race-conscious programs would be 
deemed constitutional according to the norms espoused in the 
Powell opinion? The following discussion attempts to discern, 
articulate, and apply the premises and priorities of that opinion con-
scientiously, even where they seem troublesome on one or another 
ground. To those sharply critical of the Powell analysis, it may 
be disturbing for its lack of critical evaluation; to those strongly 
hostile to race-conscious admissions programs, it may be thought 
simply a product of disagreement with the Justice. I believe that I 
have applied Justice Powell's norms in a fair-minded and con-
scientious way, and hope that most readers will agree. 
The key to Justice Powell's approach is individual competitive 
consideration for all applicants. 17 Each applicant must theoretically 
be able to compete for every open place. The race of a minority 
applicant is a factor which may be weighed against other factors in 
determining relative admissibility, but no commitment to a par-
ticular racial goal will normally be permitted to insulate any suc-
cessful applicant from that competitive inquiry. 
It is useful to consider the specifics of the Powell approach in 
the context of particular issues in the administration of a minority-
admissions program. These typically involve the numerical target 
involved; the administration of the progTam by a separate com-
mittee or sub-committee, to which some members may be appointed 
on a racial or ethnic basis; and the educational or societal objectives 
which shape a school's progTam. 
A. Numerical Targets, Goals, and Q.uotas 
Justice Powell expressly permits the overt consideration of race 
as a factor in admissions decisions, 18 yet he rejects the University 
of California's reliance, in its attempt to draw a legal distinction 
between "goals" and "quotas," on the asserted fact that the sixteen 
seats in question would only have been filled with minority appli-
17 I am indebted to my colleague on the SALT Board of Governors, Profes-
sor Robert A. Sedler, Wayne State University Law School, for this phraseology, 
18 Id. 320. 
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cants if enough were available who met an absolute standard of 
qualification.19 His reason for such rejection is that, even where a 
minimum-qualification requirement exists, as long as it is satisfied, 
"white applicants could compete only for eighty-four seats in the 
entering class, rather than the one hundred open to minority ap-
plicants." 20 This is significant to Justice Powell because it is not 
enough to look simply at the strength of the case for admitting a 
minority applicant, as the "minimum qualification" requirement 
does. There must be some examination as well of the relative 
strength of the claim of non-minority applicants at the margin of 
admissibility. The reason that the "Harvard model" is constitu-
tionally different from the Davis program is that in the former case 
"race or ethnic background . . . does not insulate the individual 
from comparison with all other candidates for the available seats." 21 
"The denial to [Bakke J of this right to individualized consideration 
without regard to his race is the principal evil of petitioner's special 
admissions program." 22 
This reasoning entails an important limitation on the permis-
sibility of a numerical target. No less important is the need to 
recognize that the limitation is itself quite limited in its thrust. 
As already noted, it in no way suggests that there is anything illicit 
about an avowed use of race in determining relative admissibility. 
It does not even prohibit the setting of a numerical target or goal, 
as long as a program that includes such a goal is administered so that 
the comparative evaluation referred to can be carried out. It there-
fore remains perfectly legitimate for a faculty to announce the hope 
or expectation-even the presumptive belief, based on prior years' 
experience-that a given number or range of minority applicants 
will be admitted, provided that before the least strong members of 
that group are admitted there is a genuine examination of their 
relative desirability as against the strongest group of non-minority 
applicants whose claim to the seats in question is at stake. 
In prescribing a determination of relative admissibility, Justice 
Powell does not preempt the discretion of each university to decide 
for itself how much weight a particular institution, in a particular 
time and place, will give to any particular factor, whether race or 
ethnic background or (to use his catalogue) "exceptional personal 
talents, unique work or service experience, leadership potential, 
19 Id. 288 & n.26, 289. 
20 Id. 289. 
21 Id. 317. 
22 Id. 318 n.52. 
1979] WHAT.BAKKE REQUIRES .OF LAW SCHOOLS 151 
maturity, demonstrated compassion, a history of overcoming dis-
advantage, ability to·communicate with the poor, or other qualifica-
tions." 23 As the Justice says: 
In short, an admissions program operated in this way is 
flexible ·enough to consider all pertinent elements of di-
versity in light of the particular qualifications of each 
applicant, and to place them on the same footing for con-
sideration, although not necessarily according them the 
same weight. Indeed, the weight attributed to a particular 
quality may vary from year to year depending upon the 
"mix" both of the student body and the. applicants for 
the incoming class. 
This kind of program treats each applicant as can 
individual in the admissions process. The applicant who 
loses out on the last available seat to another candidate 
receiving a "plus" on the basis of ethnic background will 
not have been foreclosed from all consideration for that 
seat simply because he was not the right color or had the 
wrong surname. It would mean only that his combined 
qualifications, which may have included similar nonobjec-
tive factors, did not outweigh those of the other applicant. 
His qualifications would have been weighed fairly and 
competitively, and he would have no basis to complain of 
unequal treatment under the Fourteenth Amendent.24 
Thus, a university remains free to seta numerical target and 
to. use. its own discretion in jjudging the comparative claims of the 
least strong candidates admitted under a minority-admissions pro-
gram against the claims of the most attractive unsuccessful non-
minority applicants, as long as it carries out that process in a 
timely and fair manner during each admissions cycle. Any broader 
reading of the Powell discussion of numerical goals would go be-
yond his expressed concern-individual consideration for all-and 
would fail to give weight to his espousal of the legitimacy of the 
consideration of race and to his expressions of deference to uni-
versity discretion in setting admissions. policy. 25 
The issue will .doubtless arise, how many. minority and non-
minority applicants must be weighed comparatively. There is 
2a Id. 317. 
24 Id. 317-18. 
25 Id. 315-19. A Policy Interpretation recently issued by HEW in light ·of 
Bakke asserts. that a university may .determine the ''relative weight" to be given race 
and other discretionary factors, and specifically approves a decision to give race 
"greater weight" than others. 44 Fed. Reg. 58509, 58510 ( 1979). 
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clearly no requirement that each minority applicant accepted be so 
examined. Indeed, taken literally, Justice Powell's opinion says 
that a comparison of only one applicant in each group is needed: 
"the last available seat." 26 This of course refers to the one minority 
applicant who is ranked lowest among others, yet is judged preferable 
to the one non-minority applicant ranked highest among the unac-
cepted non-minority applicants. Many schools will not want to 
make such precise gradations, and would accordingly need to com-
pare a few of each group. If the lowest-rated group of minority 
applicants whose admission is being favorably considered is com-
pared with the highest-rated group of non-minority applicants who 
are likely to be rejected, and one or more of the former is deemed 
preferable, the job is done. A school need not compare all of the 
minority applicants directly to the non-minority group because it 
can assume that all other accepted minority applicants (and rejected 
non-minority applicants) present cases which are a fortiori. Of 
course, if on a comparative evaluation of a few from each group, all 
of the minority contenders are rejected, the next-lower-rated group 
of non-minority applicants is entitled to a comparative examination 
against the next-higher-rated minority applicants. 
B. The Separate Minority-Admissions Committee 
Justice Powell does not discuss explicitly the legitimacy of the 
widespread use of a separate committee to administer a race-con-
scious program. Nonetheless, many have asserted that the rationale 
of his approach is inconsistent with such a committee. Here too, 
it is as easy to overstate the Powell position as to understate 
While his concerns require significant safeguards in the administra-
tion of a separate-committee process, they do not provide a basis 
for asserting that such a process is invalid per se. 
The discussion above regarding individual competitive con-
sideration for all provides the touchstone for analysis here. A 
separate committee may not administer a race-conscious program 
without consulting with those who administer the processing of non-
minority applicants, for if there were no such contact at least once 
in every admissions cycle the admissions process would lack the 
comparative weighing which is critical to Justice Powell; a separate 
committee could only evaluate absolute admissibility and relative 
strength from within the "special" admissions group, and that is in-
sufficient. There is no reason, however, to regard the choice of the 
particular manner by which the overall comparison is made as 
26 Id. 318. 
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beyond the law school's discretion. A separate sub-committee 
operating within the framework of a single admissions committee is 
certainly one way of doing this work. There is nothing of consti-
tutional moment, given Justice Powell's analysis, in the subcom-
mittee-parent arrangement. The two groups could work as separate 
committees, as long as there was adequate provision for their de-
liberating together when the time came to make the final compara-
tive judgments. Indeed, it would be wrong to assume, when Justice 
Powell says nothing to require the assumption, that the ultimate 
decision must be one which is left to the "regular" committee. As 
long as the job of comparative evaluation is in fact carried out in a 
timely and fair manner, Justice Powell's opinion provides no war-
rant to suggest that individuals chosen to do that work on the basis 
of any factor which seems sensible to a school-including, as is often 
the case with student members, their own racial or ethnic identifica-
tion-are constitutionally disqualified from participating in it, or 
are constitutionally relegated to an advocate's or advisor's role. It 
is the substance of the comparative evaluation, and not the particu-
lar form by which it is made, which is of constitutional import. The 
form should be decided by each school on the basis of its own per-
ceived needs and priorities, unencumbered by any assertions of legal 
mandate other than the good faith which Justice Powell requires 
and presumes. 27 
C. Program Objectives: Diversity and Others 
The final issue is that of permissible and impermissible objec-
tives in the shaping of a program. It is probably true that for many 
teachers the interest in a diverse student body has been a far less 
significant factor in individual and faculty decisions to initiate and 
shape a race-conscious program than have been other objectives.28 
These other goals the Powell opinion found insufficient in the Davis 
litigation. The question therefore arises whether diversity is the 
only licit objective which a school may consider in light of Bakke. 
For if the major determinants are to be judgments of educational 
policy, but certain objectives must be abandoned, a conscientious 
faculty might well decide to cut back its program, or give far less 
weight to one or another factor which has shaped its administra-
21 Id. 318-19 & n.53. 
28 Cf. Henkin, What of the Right to Practice a Profession?, 67 CAL. L. REV. 
131 ( 1979) (criticizing the decision in Bakke for emphasizing educational goals as 
the relevant area of state interest, rather than examining the interests affecting 
individual and group access to membership in the legal profession). 
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tion. Accordingly, it is important to address the question of the 
circumstances under which, according to Justice Powell, particular 
objectives may be sought and what their content may be. 
First, as to diversity itself: It bears repeating that Justice Powell 
does not hold that a university must value all forms of diversity 
equally, or to any particular degree. Many have expressed surprise 
at Justice Powell's rather casual assertion that the Constitution man· 
dates a particular form of diversity as educationally justifiable.29 
The apparent basis for Justice Powell's insistence that the Constitu-
tion intrudes on academic discretion to the extent of forbidding an 
interest in diversity which is limited to racial or ethnic minorities 
lies in his perception of the concerns and reach of the fourteenth 
amendment.30 As a result of these concerns, he evidently feels jus-
tified in requiring a commitment to a broader form of diversity, 
one which affords all applicants the opportunity to have considered 
the strength of their individual contributions, "including their ffwn 
potential for contribution to educational diversity." 31 But, as 
noted above, it is another matter entirely to read in this require-
ment any desire to require a university to assert any particular 
degree of commitment to specific kinds of diversity, as long as there 
is sufficient open-mindedness to give fair consideration to other 
types of claims. 
To many, a far more significant social-educational goal sup- 
porting race-conscious programs in law school is the desire to con-
tribute, through that means, to ameliorating the extreme relative 
unavailability of legal representation to members of racial and 
ethnic minorities. It is essential to bear in mind that Justice Powell 
does not cast doubt on the constitutional validity of this objective. 
(In Bakke, of course, the objective concerned medical rather than 
legal services.) He rested entirely on the position that a university 
must bear the burden of showing in litigation that its program is 
"needed [and] geared to promote that goal." 32 Any faculty which 
29 Justice Powell states that: 
the nature of the state interest that would justify consideration of race or 
ethnic background . . . is not an interest in simple ethnic diversity . . . . 
The diversity that furthers a compelling state interest encompasses a far 
broader array of qualifications and characteristics of which racial or ethnic 
origin is but a single though important element. Petitioner's special ad-
missions program, focused solely on ethnic diversity, would hinder rather 
than further attainment of genuine diversity. 
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315 (emphasis in original). 
30 See Justice Powelrs discussion of the suspect quality of racial and ethnic 
distinctions, id. 291-99. 
31 Id. 319. 
32 ld. 310. 
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believes that its program is so needed and so geared is in no way 
evading Justice Powell's mandate in continuing to permit such an 
objective to shape the admissions process. Particularly in light of 
the way Bakke was tried,33 the failure of that record to meet this 
need hardly bespeaks an inability to do so in the future. Indeed, 
in this connection it is extremely relevant that the Association of 
American Law Schools, the American Bar Association, and others 
all took the position amicus that the relationship in question does 
in fact exist. While Justice Powell rejected the adequacy of that 
form of making such a showing, the result is simply to transfer the 
question to future cases and to the proof rather than the argument 
stage. Again, differences among us as to the wisdom of that result 
should not lead us to overstate its significance. 
A third objective, and one which again has probably played a 
major role in shaping many programs, is the desire to offset historic 
patterns of societal discrimination, and more specifically to prevent 
the use of standard admissions criteria from reenforcing the effects 
of historic discrimination. Here, the conclusion that Justice Powell 
rejects the adequacy of such an interest finds rational support in his 
insistence on legislative, judicial, or administrative findings both of 
particular discrimination by specific schools and of the equity of a 
specific race-conscious program as a remedy for concrete wrongful 
acts.34 Even here, however, the Powell position may have a nar-
rower reach than many attribute to it. First, the opinion does not 
at all address the question what options are available to a faculty 
which honestly believes that there has been actual past discrimina-
tory conduct at its school. Were a rejected minority applicant to 
bring a suit which came to judgment before a Bakke-type suit, there 
might well be the remedial predicate upon which Justice Powell 
insists. It seems bizarre to say that a faculty may not consider the 
vulnerability of its institution to such a suit in structuring a pro-
gram.35 This issue would be particularly poignant in any school in 
33 See Bell, Bakke, Minority Admissions, and the Usual Price of Racial Reme-
dies, 61 CAL. L. REv. 3, 4-7 ( 1979); Smith, Reflections on a Landmark, 21 How. 
L.J. 72, 77-79 (1978). 
34 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307-10. 
35 Compare the perceptions of Justices Brennan and Blackmun in United Steel-
workers of America v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. 2721 ( 1979) : "It would be ironic indeed 
if a law [Title VII] higgered by a Nation's concern over centuries of racial in-
justice ... constituted the first legislative prohibition of all voluntary, private, race-
conscious efforts to abolish traditional patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy," 
id. 2728, (opinion of the Court per Brennan, J.); "[it] would be 'ironic,' given the 
broad remedial purposes of Title VII," to interpret the statute to "lock in" the effects 
of past segregation, id. 2733, (opinion of Blackmun, J.). 
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which such a suit was actually pending when its program was 
adopted. 
More broadly, Justice Powell does not wholly close the door 
on the legitimacy of a school's departing from its normal standards 
because of its concern that they would be regarded as discriminatory 
in the objective sense that their disparate racial impact is not jus-
tified by their predictive validity in judging among qualified ap-
plicants. He rejects this contention in Bakke in substantial part on 
the ground that there was nothing in the record below suggesting 
that any disparate impact "is without educational justification." 86 
Accepting the evident holding that the burden here rests on those 
defending the program to show the lack of educational justification 
for the school's normal standards, it may well remain open to a 
school to act on a belief that such justification is in fact lacking, and 
to stand prepared to support that conclusion in litigation, much as 
Justice Powell plainly permits with respect to demonstrating the 
minority community's need for more minority lawyers. Again, 
whatever one might think of the wisdom of having this issue liti-
gated in individual suits, Justice Powell clearly elected to require 
that method. 87 
IV. SUMMARY 
First, a university which desires to operate a race-conscious 
admissions program not meeting Mr. Justice Powell's criteria has a 
sufficient legal basis for doing so. 
a) Stated as requisites of constitutionality, the Powell criteria 
have been rejected by every Justice who has considered the question. 
b) The conclusion that the Powell criteria represent conditions 
of lawfulness which a majority of the Supreme Court has found to 
36 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 308 n.44. 
37 Some will read the whole of Justice Powell's note 44, 438 U.S. at 308 n.44, 
more broadly, either to require as well that the university be prepared to prove in 
court that the disparate impact was the product of discrimination, or to reject the suf-
ficiency of "disparate impact" analysis in Title VI litigation altogether. The require-
ment of the first of these broader readings is one which a faculty might think could 
readily be met in litigation, cf. Justice Blackmun's observation in United Steel-
workers of America v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. 2721, 2732 n.* (1979) (concurring opin-
ion) (underrepresentation of blacks in the craft work force did stem from "pur-
poseful discrimination in the past"). The second broad reading of note 44 would 
reject the legitimacy of any proof which might be offered. Whatever is ultimately 
said further about note 44, the issue can hardly be thought at present to have 
been resolved with clarity and finality. The recent HEW Policy Interpretation reads 
Bakke to permit a university which has not discriminated to act to "overcome the 
effects of conditions which resulted in limiting [minority] participation . . . ," 
44 Fed. Reg. 58509, 58511 (1979). 
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be necessary under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 rests 
on a judgment to disregard all of the following aspects of the Bakke 
opinions: 
(l) Justice specifically disclaims any judgment re-
garding the general legitimacy of race-conscious programs. 
(2) The Justices joining the Stevens opinion voted as they 
did on a view of Title VI as independent of constitutional 
norms, a view now squarely rejected by a majority of the 
Court. 
(3) Justice Powell himself has not resolved a question-
the existence of a private right of action under Title VI-which 
is anterior to his joining any majority to hold a program in 
violation of the statute. 
While a conclusion to disregard all these factors is permissible, it is 
not required by a conscientious fair-minded reading of the Bakke 
opinions or by relevant ethical or prudential considerations. 
Second, a university which elects to structure its law-school 
admissions program to meet Justice Powell's criteria of constitu-
tionality may act as follows: 
a) Race or ethnic identity may be overtly employed as a factor 
enhancing the relative admissibility of minority applicants, pro-
vided that such admissibility is not determined merely according 
to an absolute measure of qualification or by a comparative ranking 
of minority applicants against one another, but includes an evalua-
tion of the relative qualifications (judged by the school's criteria) 
of the lowest-ranked group of favorably considered minority ap-
plicants and the highest-ranked group of unfavorably considered 
non-minority applicants. 
b) A specific numerical objective for mm1mum minority-stu-
dent membership in the entering class may be employed as a guide-
line or goal for those administering the program, provided that 
neither the size of the number chosen nor the strength of the desire 
not to depart from it impairs the ability of those administering the 
program to carry out in good faith the comparative evaluation 
required. 
c) A law school may employ a committee to which members 
are assigned on the basis of their racial or ethnic identification to 
administer a minority-admissions program, provided that the re-
quired comparative evaluation is made. As long as that compara-
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tive evaluation can be and is carried out in a fair and timely way, a 
school may structure the relation between the processing of minority 
and non-minority applicants, including the existence and respective 
roles. of .separate committees, as iit wishes. 
d) In considering the educational or societal goals which a 
race-conscious program is intended:: to serve, a law school: 
(1) may not pursue the goal of .diversity by a consideration 
of raciaror ethnic diversity alone, but may pursue those forms 
of diversity along with others, and in doing so may choose 
which other aspects: of diversity to value and to: what degree; 
(2) may seek to ameliorate the relative unavailability of 
legal representation to members of minority groups only if it 
is prepared to establish in any litigation that its program is 
necessary and useful to meet that objective; 
(3) may, seek to offset; or avoid reenforcing, historic pat-
terns of societal discrimination only if-and here, the contours 
of the "only" are least clear -- it is prepared to establish in any 
litigation that purposeful discrimination existed at the par-
ticular school involved or that the "regular" criteria of ad-
missibility have a disparate racial impact (perhaps one attribut-
able 'to societal discrimination) and are lacking in predictive or 
other educational justification; 
